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CODIFYING MANIFEST DISREGARD
Christopher R. Drahozal*
INTRODUCTION
Despite being overruled in 1989, Wilko v. Swan1 continues to be cited as
authorizing courts to review arbitration awards for “manifest disregard of the
law.”2  Of course, Wilko itself did not review an award for manifest disregard
of the law, much less vacate an award on that ground.  Instead, while holding
that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate 1933 Securities Act claims were unen-
forceable (the holding that has been overruled), the Court stated its famous
dictum that “[i]n unrestricted submissions . . . the interpretations of the law by
the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”3  The Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”) nowhere expressly provides for an award to be vacated for mani-
fest disregard of the law,4 nor has the Supreme Court since Wilko ever
reviewed an award on that ground.5  Nonetheless, based on the Wilko dictum,
every United States Court of Appeals has adopted some form of “manifest dis-
regard” review.6
As a “non-statutory”7 or “judicially-created”8 ground for vacating arbitra-
tion awards, based on dicta in an overruled Supreme Court case, Wilko lacks a
firm doctrinal footing.  The circuits disagree on what manifest disregard is
(with the Seventh Circuit in particular adopting its own, idiosyncratic
* John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law.  This article is
based on a presentation at a conference on “Rethinking the Federal Arbitration Act,” held at
the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, on January 26, 2007.  I appreciate helpful comments on the presentation
from participants at the conference and on a draft of this article from Steve Ware and
Richard Reuben.
1 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
2 A search of the LexisNexis “Federal & State Cases, Combined” database on August 24,
2007, found that Wilko has been cited 449 times in state and federal court opinions since
being overruled.  A similar search of the LexisNexis “U.S. Law Reviews and Journals, Com-
bined” database revealed that Wilko has been cited 604 times in law journals over the same
period.  Certainly some of the citations were to the fact that Wilko had been overruled, but
not all (or even most).
3 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (emphasis added).
4 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). But see infra text accompanying notes 39-43.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 48-56.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 11-15.
7 E.g., Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 878 (2003).
8 E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir.
1986).
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approach) and how the standard should be applied.9  Moreover, manifest disre-
gard review is difficult to justify, as some have done, as a device for ensuring
that arbitrators properly apply mandatory rules in their awards.10  Courts using
manifest disregard review to ensure compliance with mandatory rules face a
dilemma:  If they apply manifest disregard review narrowly, arbitrators can eas-
ily evade court review, rendering it ineffective; if they apply manifest disregard
review broadly, court review will be so intrusive that it will undercut the arbi-
tration process.
Nonetheless, this Article argues in favor of codifying manifest disregard
of the law as a ground for vacating arbitration awards.  Codification would
substantially reduce uncertainty by giving manifest disregard both a solid statu-
tory foundation and a settled statutory definition.  The policy justification for
codification is not to prevent underenforcement of mandatory rules, but rather
to preserve the integrity of the court system.  Without manifest disregard
review, a court may face the prospect of having to confirm an arbitration award
in which the arbitrators on the face of the award blatantly refuse to apply
clearly applicable law.  Putting the power of the court behind such an award
would undercut the legitimacy of the judicial system.  Manifest disregard
review permits courts to protect their own integrity—even if only rarely (if
ever) actually vacating an award.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the current status of
review for manifest disregard of the law.  Part II looks at the (very shaky)
doctrinal basis for manifest disregard review.  Part III discusses the dilemma
courts face in trying to use manifest disregard to ensure that arbitrators apply
mandatory rules of law.  Part IV argues for codifying manifest disregard as a
way of protecting the legitimacy and integrity of the courts in enforcing arbitra-
tion awards.
I. MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW AS A GROUND
FOR VACATING AWARDS
Every United States Court of Appeals has reviewed arbitral awards for
some form of “manifest disregard of the law.”11  A common formulation of the
test for manifest disregard is the following:  “A party seeking to establish mani-
fest disregard of the law sufficient to warrant setting aside an arbitral award
must demonstrate that the arbitrators appreciated the existence and applicability
of a controlling legal rule but intentionally decided not to apply it.”12  Some
circuits add that law must be “well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to
the case” (although that may be implicit in the general test),13 or that enforcing
9 See infra text accompanying notes 24-29; see, e.g., George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany &
Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 67-94.
11 See Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 48-49 (Ala. 2004) (citing cases).  By
comparison, in construing their own arbitration statutes, some states have refused to recog-
nize manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur, while others have adopted it. See Sooner
Builders & Inv., Inc. v. Nolan Hatcher Constr. Servs., L.L.C., 164 P.3d 1063, 1072 nn.14-15
(Okla. 2007) (citing cases).
12 Cytyc Corp. v. Deka Prods. Ltd. P’ship, 439 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2006).
13 Bear, Stearns & Co. v. 1109580 Ontario, Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
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the award would “result in significant injustice.”14  Under the usual standard
for manifest disregard of the law, it is not enough that the arbitrators make an
error of law in reaching their award.15  Instead, the arbitrators must know what
the law is and consciously refuse to apply it.
Stephen Hayford has identified three different ways courts apply this usual
standard, which he calls the “futility acknowledged” approach, the “big error”
approach, and the “presumption-based” approach.16  He defines these
approaches as follows:
• “Futility Acknowledged” Approach:  “In the most simplistic mode of response
reviewing courts concede the futility of attempting to divine the arbitrator’s state of
mind . . . in the absence of a reasoned award and summarily reject the petition for
vacatur.”17
• “Big Error” Approach:  This approach “bypasses the ‘mens rea’ component
entirely and relies instead upon an inference of constructive knowledge of the law
by the arbitrator based on the clarity of the relevant law and the degree of error
reflected in the challenged award.”18  As a result, “[t]his mode of analysis effec-
tively transforms the ‘manifest disregard’ of the law test into a standard warranting
vacatur anytime an arbitrator commits what amounts to a ‘big error’ of law.”19
• “Presumption-Based” Approach:  Under this approach, courts “presume, through
various devices, arbitral knowledge of the correct interpretation of the law at issue,
based upon the courts[’] independent evaluation of the record made in arbitration,
and . . . based on the presumption, . . . infer a conscious or intentional disregard of
the law.”20
Hayford argues that the usual standard for manifest disregard often “permutes
from a test centering on the arbitrator’s state of mind . . . and his conduct . . .
into an analysis concerned only with the purported correctness of the arbitration
award on the law, and in some cases the facts.”21  As a result, he concludes that
manifest disregard review encourages losing parties in arbitration to challenge
awards on grounds of legal error, without regard to whether the arbitrator knew
or disregarded governing law.22  Hayford is not alone in this assertion, as dis-
cussed further below.23
14 Sarofim v. Trust Co. of the W., 440 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2006).
15 E.g., P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Thus, ‘a
mere mistake of law by an arbitrator cannot serve as the basis for judicial review.’  Rather,
‘manifest disregard’ means that ‘arbitrators knew the law and explicitly disregarded it.’”
(internal citation omitted)); cf. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
36 (1987) (“‘The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.’”  (quoting United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960))).
16 Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard:  The Key
to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 117, 125-32.  Further varia-
tions have developed since Hayford wrote the article, most notably the Seventh Circuit’s
variant discussed infra text accompanying notes 24-29.
17 Hayford, supra note 16, at 125-26.
18 Id. at 127.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 129 (citing, e.g., Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998)).
21 Id. at 132.
22 Id.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 89-94.
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Alternative standards for manifest disregard exist as well, most notably in
the Seventh Circuit.  That court initially took an approach to manifest disregard
similar to that of other circuits.24  But in Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross,
Inc.,25 Judge Richard A. Posner expressed skepticism about manifest disregard
as a ground for vacatur, concluding that “[t]he grounds for setting aside arbitra-
tion awards are exhaustively stated in the statute.  Now that Wilko is history,
there is no reason to continue to echo its gratuitous attempt at nonstatutory
supplementation.”26  In George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co.,27 the Sev-
enth Circuit “resolve[d] the tension in the competing lines of cases” by constru-
ing manifest disregard of the law to apply only when the arbitrator “direct[s]
the parties to violate the law.”28  Subsequently, the court of appeals explained
that this definition is “so narrow[ ] that it fits comfortably” as a case in which
the arbitrators have exceeded their authority—a ground for vacatur under sec-
tion 10(a)(4) of the FAA.29  No other circuit has followed the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of manifest disregard.
Although parties often challenge awards on the ground that arbitrators
manifestly disregarded the law, only rarely do they succeed.  Michael H.
LeRoy and Peter Feuille studied 336 state and federal cases challenging
employment arbitration awards from 1975-2006.30  They found that manifest
disregard of the law was the most commonly asserted ground for vacatur:  A
party challenged an award as being in manifest disregard of the law in 35.1%
(84 of 239) of the trial court cases studied and 30.4% (49 of 161) of the appel-
late court cases studied.31  But the challenges only rarely were successful:
Courts vacated awards for manifest disregard in only 7.1% of the trial court
cases (6 of 84) and 8.2% of the appellate court cases (4 of 49) in which it was
raised.  Lawrence R. Mills et al. obtained similar results based on a sample of
all reported state and federal cases in which parties sought to vacate arbitration
awards between January 1, 2004, and October 31, 2004.32  They found that
while manifest disregard of the law was the second most commonly asserted
ground (in 52 out of 182 cases, or 28.6%), the challenge succeeded only twice
(3.8%).33  Given the showing required for establishing manifest disregard,
24 E.g., Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1992).
25 Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994).
26 Id. at 706.
27 George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
28 Id. at 580.
29 Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 268 (2006).
30 Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After:  When Final and Binding Arbi-
tration Has No Fairy Tale Ending ii (Spring 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=michael_leroy).
31 Id. at 25; see also Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Revolving Door of Justice:
Arbitration Agreements that Expand Court Review of an Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 861, 907 (2004) (“The most frequent variant alleged that the award was made in
manifest disregard of the law (sixty-five cases, or 42.8%).”).
32 Lawrence R. Mills et al., Vacating Arbitration Awards, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2005, at 23.
33 Id. at 25.  The most commonly asserted ground was that the arbitrators exceeded their
authority, which was raised in 101 of the 182 cases, and was successful in 21 cases (20.8%
of those in which it was raised). Id.
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those results are not surprising34 but certainly add support to the criticisms by
Hayford (and others).35
II. DOCTRINAL ORIGINS OF MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW
Although manifest disregard of the law is now widely accepted by lower
courts as a ground for reviewing arbitration awards, its doctrinal foundations
are far from solid.  The FAA does not expressly list manifest disregard as a
ground for vacatur, and attempts to derive the manifest disregard standard from
the statutory grounds have not proven persuasive.  Instead, lower courts con-
tinue to cite Wilko v. Swan as the source of manifest disregard review, even
though that case has been overruled and its original statement concerning mani-
fest disregard was merely dictum.  Indeed, the authorities cited in the Wilko
opinion support a very different conception of manifest disregard from the one
used today, casting further doubt on the standard.  At best, Wilko provides a
very shaky foundation for the modern conception of manifest disregard.
A. Manifest Disregard and the FAA
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act sets out the familiar “statutory”
grounds for vacating an arbitration award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and mate-
rial to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.36
These statutory grounds focus on the fairness of the procedure and the authority
of the arbitrator,37 much as the Due Process Clauses of the United States Con-
stitution require courts to hold fundamentally fair trials and to have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.38  Section 10 by its terms does not provide for
review of the substance of an arbitration award—whether for manifest disre-
gard of the law or otherwise.
34 4 IAN R MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.7.1, at 40:85 (1994) (“In
terms of outcome of judicial decisions, however, the doctrine seems singularly unimportant.
It is nearly impossible to find FAA arbitration decisions where application of the doctrine
has resulted in upsetting of an award.”).
35 See supra text accompanying notes 16-22 and infra text accompanying notes 89-94.
36 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).  In addition, section 11 of the FAA sets out grounds on which a
court may modify or correct an award. Id. § 11.
37 WILLIAM W. PARK, PROCEDURAL EVOLUTION IN BUSINESS ARBITRATION:  THREE STUDIES
IN CHANGE 9 (2006) (“[C]ourts intervene only to monitor arbitration’s basic procedural
integrity, by assuring (i) the basic procedural fairness of an arbitration (lack of bias, right to
be heard, and equality of arms) and (ii) respect for limits of arbitral jurisdiction.”).
38 A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:  A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
617, 629 (2006).
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To be sure, some courts and commentators have sought to derive manifest
disregard of the law from one of the statutory grounds in section 10.  For exam-
ple, Ian R. Macneil et al. treat manifest disregard as an application of the excess
of authority ground in section 10(a)(4).39  They argue that in the absence of any
express agreement between the parties, the scope of the arbitrators’ authority is
defined by implied arbitral powers—those “generally expected in American
arbitration and allowed under American arbitration law.”40  On this view, a
challenge for manifest disregard “is based on the assumption that the parties did
not agree to allow the arbitrators manifestly to disregard the law,” and so when
the arbitrators did, they exceeded their authority.41  But this argument seems to
assume its answer—that in fact it is generally expected that arbitrators will not
manifestly disregard the law.  Moreover, it is by no means clear that that is the
case, as discussed below.42
Others have suggested that manifest disregard might be a form of arbitral
misconduct within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).  Stephen Hayford
asserts:
[A] more plausible reading of the Wilko dictum is one in which its oblique reference
to “manifest disregard” is viewed as identifying a type of arbitral misconduct or
misbehavior of the nature addressed in section 10(a)(3) of the FAA, which can trig-
ger vacatur under that provision.  This mode of analysis would turn, not on the
degree of an arbitrator’s purported error of law, but rather on the “degree of [her]
disregard” of the law . . . .  If the court concludes that the arbitrator did ignore the law
that she correctly understood, vacatur of the disputed arbitration award would be
warranted, under section 10(a)(3) of the FAA, based on the arbitrator’s improper
conduct.43
This seems to be a generous reading of the Court’s Wilko dictum, which
focused on the lack of substantive review of awards rather than on possible
arbitrator misconduct.  The statutory interpretation question is whether manifest
disregard of the law is sufficiently like the types of arbitrator “misconduct”
listed in section 10(a)(3)—i.e., refusing to postpone the hearing and refusing to
hear pertinent evidence—to fall within the scope of the provision.
While both of these possibilities provide a statutory hook for manifest dis-
regard of the law, they are by no means conclusive.  Nor have they been widely
39 See 4 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 34, § 40.1.3.2, at 40:11-12 (“These purportedly non-
statutory powers are, however, in fact very closely related to the ground for vacation in FAA
§ 10(d) that the arbitrators exceeded their powers.  Indeed, all these grounds can easily be
viewed as simply definitions of what it means for the arbitrators to exceed their powers
under FAA § 10(d).”).
40 Id. § 40.5.2.4, at 40:46.
41 Id. § 40.5.2.4, at 40:47.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 60-66.
43 Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:  Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial
Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 816-17 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
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accepted.  With some exceptions,44 courts commonly continue to cite to Wilko
as the source for manifest disregard review rather than the FAA itself.45
B. Supreme Court Precedent and the Origins of Manifest Disregard Review
As indicated above, the “manifest disregard of the law” ground for vacatur
typically is traced to a single sentence in Wilko, which states that “[i]n
unrestricted submissions . . . the interpretations of law by the arbitrators in
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial
review for error in interpretation.”46  Given that Wilko did not involve an action
to vacate an arbitration award, and has been overruled in any event, this doctri-
nal basis is a “slender . . . reed” indeed on which to base such a legal
doctrine.47
The Supreme Court has twice referred to the “manifest disregard” standard
since Wilko’s overruling.48  Most notably, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan,49 the Court described the grounds for vacating arbitration awards as
follows:
The party still can ask a court to review the arbitrator’s decision, but the court will set
that decision aside only in very unusual circumstances. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10
(award procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; arbitrator exceeded his pow-
ers); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-437 (1953) (parties bound by arbitrator’s
decision not in “manifest disregard” of the law), overruled on other grounds, Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).50
44 See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc) (“We have held that arbitrators ‘exceed their powers’ in this regard not
when they merely interpret or apply the governing law incorrectly, but when the award is
‘completely irrational,’ or exhibits a ‘manifest disregard of law.’” (internal citation omit-
ted)); San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d
796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961) (“Similar manifest infidelity to what the arbitrators know to be the
law, but deliberately disregard might well be regarded as the use of ‘undue means’ within the
meaning of subdivision (a) of 9 U.S.C. § 10, or amount to ‘partiality’ within the meaning of
subdivision (b) thereof.”).
45 See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
46 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (emphasis added), overruled on other
grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
The discussion in text focuses on the phrase “manifest disregard of the law.”  In addition, the
opening clause of the quote—“[i]n unrestricted submission”—also has significant implica-
tions for American arbitration law.  An “unrestricted submission” is one in which the parties
do not require the arbitrators to follow the law.  In such a case, as the Wilko Court notes,
court review of awards on the merits is highly deferential.  By contrast, a “restricted submis-
sion” is one in which the parties agree to require the arbitrators to follow the law.  At com-
mon law, when arbitrators decided under a restricted submission, courts could review the
award de novo for mistakes of law—thus permitting parties to contract for expanded review
of an award. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA:  Default Rules,
Mandatory Rules, and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 419,
431-33 (2003).
47 Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration:  Rethinking the Rela-
tionship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standard for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 443, 471 (1998).
48 For discussion of pre-overruling references to Wilko in Supreme Court cases, see Hay-
ford, supra note 43, at 775.
49 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
50 Id. at 942.
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On the basis of this citation, Macneil et al. state that “however dead the rest of
Wilko undoubtedly is, the ‘manifest disregard’ aspect of Wilko seems to be
alive and well, having been resurrected, if ever dead, by the Supreme Court in”
First Options.51  In addition, Justice Stevens dissenting in Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer52 likewise cited Wilko in describing the
limited judicial review of arbitration awards.53
But in neither of these cases did the Court actually rely on manifest disre-
gard to review an award, much less vacate an award on that ground.  A citation
(in dicta) to an overruled dictum in a prior Supreme Court case is a weak basis
on which to conclude that the prior dictum has been “resurrected” as a ground
for judicial review.  At least First Options, unlike Wilko itself, involved an
action to vacate an award.54  But the vacatur ground asserted was not manifest
disregard of the law.  Instead, the Kaplans argued that they had never agreed to
arbitrate, relying on the section 10(a)(4) excess of authority ground55 (because
if they never agreed to arbitrate, the arbitrator lacked authority to proceed).
And Justice Stevens’ dissent was just that—a dissent—in a case in which the
issue was the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate, not a challenge to an
award.56  Thus, the “slender reed” supporting manifest disregard review is a
slender one indeed.
Not only is the authority for manifest disregard weak, the Supreme Court
has offered no guidance on what the phrase “manifest disregard of the law”
means.  The above-quoted references do little more than reiterate the phrase
“manifest disregard” and suggest that the standard for vacatur is a high one.
The courts of appeals have adopted what seems to be a textual understanding of
the phrase, interpreting “manifest disregard” much as they would a statute.  As
Hans Smit explains:
In subsequent lower court decisions, the courts have stressed that disregard implies
an element of deliberateness and have required that the arbitrators knowingly and
purposefully disregarded what they knew the law to be.  The circumstance that the
errors of law had to be manifest or obvious, to a certain extent, facilitated the requi-
site finding of deliberativeness.57
The result of that textual interpretation, as discussed above, is the nearly uni-
versal test for manifest disregard of the law:  that arbitrators must know what
the law is and knowingly refuse to follow it.  But the Supreme Court has never
51 See 4 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 34, § 40.7.1, at 40:43-40:44 (Supp. 1999) (“In First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (U.S. 1995), the Supreme Court made clear that the only
nonstatutory ground for vacation is manifest disregard of the law.”).
52 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
53 Id. at 548-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to “high standard applicable to vacation
of arbitration awards”).
54 First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
55 Id.
56 Vimar Seguros, 515 U.S. at 530.
57 Hans Smit, Manifest Disregard of the Law in the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, First Department, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 111, 121 (2004); see, e.g., Advest, Inc.
v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (“In this context . . . ‘disregard’ implies that the
arbitrators appreciated the existence of a governing legal rule but willfully decided not to
apply it.”).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ110.txt unknown Seq: 9 17-JAN-08 8:17
242 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:234
addressed that interpretation,58 and one can certainly question whether
Supreme Court opinions should be read as if they were statutes.
Moreover, the authorities the Wilko Court cited in support of its statement
about the scope of court review cast light on the meaning of the dictum.  Foot-
note 24 of the opinion, which appears immediately after the dictum concerning
judicial review, contains a long citation list:
Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344, 349; United States v. Farragut, 22 Wall. 406, 413,
419–421 (note the right of review); Kleine v. Catara, 14 Fed. Cas. 732, No. 7,869;
Texas & P. R. Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 158 F. 2d 251, 256; The Hart-
bridge, 62 F.2d 72, 73.  In Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Assn. v. United Cas. Co.,
142 F. 2d 390, 393, the problem was dealt with on the basis of the Massachusetts
law.  See Sturges, [Commercial Arbitrations and Awards]; Note, Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 681, 685, Award Based on Erro-
neous Rule; Cox, The Place of Law in Labor Arbitration, XXXIV Chicago Bar Rec.
205.59
Those authorities suggest an understanding of manifest disregard of the law
very much at odds with the current doctrine.
As discussed above, the modern conception of manifest disregard permits
courts to vacate an arbitration award only when the arbitrator knowingly ref-
uses to apply clearly applicable law.  Courts cannot vacate an award simply
because the arbitrator makes an error of law, even if the error is obvious on the
face of the award.  Under the common law of arbitration predating the FAA—
as reflected in the sources cited by the Court in Wilko (among others)—the rule
was the opposite:  Arbitrators could knowingly disregard the law, but if they
tried to follow it and did so incorrectly, the award would be set aside.  Thus,
James Gaitis writes, based on analysis of “the substantial body of case law that
existed at the time Wilko was decided,” that “contrary to the general thrust of
the Wilko ‘manifest disregard’ statement, under ‘unrestricted’ arbitration sub-
missions, arbitrators should be deemed to be authorized to intentionally disre-
gard applicable law should they so choose.”60  As Michael Scodro concludes in
his analysis, “[T]he historical sources on which the Wilko Court relied . . . are
of tremendous interest because many actually conflict with the ‘manifest disre-
gard’ standard in use today.”61
The following excerpt from Justice Story’s opinion (while riding circuit)
in Kleine v. Catara,62 which was cited in Wilko, provides a good illustration:
If, therefore, under an unqualified submission, the referees meaning to take upon
themselves the whole responsibility, and not to refer it to the court, to decide differ-
ently from what the court would on a point of law, the award ought not to be set
aside.  If, however, the referees mean to decide according to law, and mistake, and
refer it to the court to review their decision, (as in all cases, where they specially state
58 Hayford, supra note 47, at 466.
59 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 n.24 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
60 James M. Gaitis, Unraveling the Mystery of Wilko v. Swan:  American Arbitration Vaca-
tur Law and the Accidental Demise of Party Autonomy, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 4-5
(2007).
61 Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547,
581 (2005).
62 Kleine v. Catara, 14 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7869).
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the principles, on which they have acted, they are presumed to do,) in such cases, the
court will set aside the award, for it is not the award, which the referees meant to
make, and they acted under a mistake.63
In other words, at common law, if the arbitrators intentionally disregarded the
law, the court would not vacate the award.  But if the arbitrators attempted to
follow the law and made a mistake, the award was subject to vacatur.  The
modern conception of manifest disregard turns the common law standard on its
head.
That said, there is some support in common law authorities for manifest
disregard of the law as it is currently formulated—although these sources were
not cited by the Court in Wilko.  In Allen v. Smith’s Administrator,64 an 1845
Delaware Superior Court case, the court described its standard of review as
follows:
But in no case will the court re-try the cause, or go into an examination of the merits
of an award; or set it aside because they would have drawn different conclusions
from the arbitrators, from conflicting testimony; or would have made a different
award.  But where it manifestly appears that the arbitrators have clearly mistaken the
law, or that they knew what the law was, and purposely disregarded it, or that they
have made an evident mistake in matter of fact, the court[s] are bound to set aside an
award, as they are to set aside a verdict which is manifestly against the law or the
facts.65
Allen in turn was cited by Philip G. Phillips in a 1934 Harvard Law Review
article as providing “some intimation . . . that if the arbitrators know the law,
and deliberately choose to disregard it, their awards may be set aside.”66  None-
theless, the great bulk of the common law authority—including those on point
cited in Wilko—conflicts with rather than supports the current standard for
manifest disregard of the law.
III. MANIFEST DISREGARD AND FEDERAL STATUTORY CLAIMS
Not only is the doctrinal basis for manifest disregard weak, but courts
using manifest disregard review to ensure compliance with mandatory legal
rules have distorted its application.67  Courts using manifest disregard for such
an end face a dilemma:  either apply manifest disregard narrowly, in which case
arbitrators easily can evade review, or apply it broadly, in which case it risks
undercutting the arbitration process altogether.
The Supreme Court’s decisions permitting arbitration of federal statutory
claims—culminating in the overruling of Wilko—have lead to fears that arbi-
63 Id. at 735.
64 Allen v. Smith’s Adm’r, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 234 (1845).
65 Id. at 236-37 (emphasis added).
66 Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 590, 604 (1934) (citing Allen, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 234).
67 Commentators have criticized manifest disregard review on other grounds as well. See,
e.g., 4 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 34, § 40.7.2.5, at 40:91 (“Three criticisms may be made
of manifest disregard doctrine:  (1) it fails to focus on the very issues appearing to underlie
it; (2) it often confers power on arbitrators beyond what at least one party intended or would
have intended if fully informed; and (3) perhaps parties should not be able to confer so much
power on arbitrators, that is, their freedom of contract should be curtailed.”).
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trators will misapply federal law, permitting parties to turn mandatory rules into
default rules.68  Dicta in several of the cases, including Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.69 and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,70 seem designed to assuage these fears—by suggesting that courts
retain at least some power to review the merits of awards.  Thus, the Court in
Mitsubishi stated that “[h]aving permitted the arbitration to go forward, the
national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-
enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of
the antitrust laws has been addressed.”71  Likewise, in Gilmer, the Court
rejected the contention that “judicial review of arbitration decisions is too lim-
ited,” quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon72 to the effect that
“‘although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such
review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of
the statute’ at issue.”73
Subsequent courts have linked these statements to manifest disregard
review.  According to the D.C. Circuit in Cole v. Burns International Security
Services74:
Two assumptions have been central to the Court’s decisions in this area.  First, the
Court has insisted that, “‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolu-
tion in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’”  Second, the Court has stated
repeatedly that, “‘although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is lim-
ited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements
of the statute’ at issue.”  These twin assumptions regarding the arbitration of statutory
claims are valid only if judicial review under the “manifest disregard of the law”
standard is sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted
and applied statutory law.75
68 E.g., Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1999).
69 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
70 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
71 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.  The Court goes on to state that “[w]hile the efficacy of the
arbitral process requires that substantive review at the award-enforcement stage remain mini-
mal, it would not require intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of
the antitrust claims and actually decided them.” Id.  Commentators have described the Mit-
subishi dictum as permitting courts to take a “second look” at the award—i.e., determining
whether or not “the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided
them.”  Donald Francis Donovan & Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Mitsubishi After Twenty
Years:  Mandatory Rules Before Courts and International Arbitrators, in PERVASIVE
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 11, 23, 27 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M.
Lew eds., 2006).
72 Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
73 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 n.4 (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232).
74 Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
75 Id. at 1487 (internal citations omitted); see Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American
Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 449, 525 (2005) (“It is true that as
disputes arising from mandatory law are increasingly swept into arbitration, courts naturally
have come under increasing pressure to ensure that statutory policy is being vindicated. . . .
As a consequence they may think it necessary—as Judge Edwards suggested in Cole—to
breathe new life into the ‘manifest disregard of law’ standard . . . .”).
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Stated otherwise, such authorities treat manifest disregard review—applied
“sufficiently rigorous[ly]”—as a means of ensuring that arbitrators properly
apply mandatory legal rules.76
Courts using manifest disregard for such an end, however, face a dilemma.
A narrow manifest disregard standard is likely to be ineffective in ensuring
compliance with mandatory legal rules.  Arbitrators who want to disregard the
law can readily evade such manifest disregard review.  In domestic arbitrations,
they can simply not make a reasoned award.77  Without a reasoned award, there
is little a reviewing court can do to find manifest disregard, at least under a
narrow manifest disregard standard.  Even if the arbitrators make a reasoned
award, they need only make unsupported factual findings (because manifest
disregard of the facts ordinarily is not a ground for vacating an award).78  Pre-
sumably it is for reasons such as these that Alan Scott Rau said, after describing
manifest disregard as requiring that “the losing party must demonstrate that the
arbitrators ‘deliberately disregarded what they knew to be the law in order to
reach the result they did,’” that:  “This will never happen in our lifetimes.”79
But it has, in fact “happen[ed] in our lifetimes,” albeit not very often.80
Courts have vacated awards for manifest disregard of the law—usually by
applying what Hayford describes as the “big error” approach or the “presump-
tion-based” approach.81  The most notable example (which Hayford includes in
the latter category) is Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.,82 in which the Second
Circuit vacated an employment arbitration award for manifest disregard of the
“law or the evidence or both.”83  In Halligan, a claimant sought to vacate an
award that rejected a claim of age discrimination in employment.  On appeal,
76 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487.  As Steve Ware rightly points out, although the focus often is on
federal statutory claims, the important distinction is between mandatory rules (whether statu-
tory or otherwise) and default rules.  Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration:  Chapter 1 of
the Federal Arbitration Act, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
88, 116-20 (2006).
77 Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 529-30 (1997).
78 See Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 193 (2d Cir. 2004).
79 Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
213, 237-38 (1996); see also Lucy Reed & Phillip Riblett, Expansion of Defenses to
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards in U.S. Courts?, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM.
121, 133 (2006) (“It is difficult to imagine an international arbitrator writing an award in
which he or she painstakingly sets out an applicable legal principle and then defiantly
ignores it or states that he or she will not apply it.”); Hans Smit, Is Manifest Disregard of the
Law or the Evidence or Both a Ground for Vacatur of an Arbitral Award?, 8 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 341, 342 (1997) (The manifest disregard standard “presupposes an exceptionally
obtuse arbitrator.”).
80 See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.  Indeed, Rau later recanted, stating that “my
powers of prophecy—reasoning to what I consider to be unimpeachably ‘correct’ results—
are occasionally flawed.”  Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About
“Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 83 n.199
(2003).
81 See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
82 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034
(1999).
83 Id. at 204.  Subsequently, the Second Circuit made clear that while manifest disregard of
the law was a ground for vacating arbitration awards, manifest disregard of the evidence was
not. Wallace, 378 F.3d at 193.
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the Second Circuit found “strong evidence that Halligan was fired because of
his age.”84  Because the parties agreed that “the arbitrators were correctly
advised of the applicable legal principles,” the court stated that it was “inclined
to hold that they ignored the law or the evidence or both.”85  The court bol-
stered its conclusion by drawing a negative inference from the lack of a rea-
soned award by the arbitrators:  “[W]here a reviewing court is inclined to find
that arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law or the evidence and that an
explanation, if given, would have strained credulity, the absence of explanation
may reinforce the reviewing court’s confidence that the arbitrators engaged in
manifest disregard.”86  Other courts have applied manifest disregard broadly by
extending it to manifest disregard of the contract87 and manifest disregard of a
default (rather than mandatory) legal rule.88
These sorts of attempts by courts to prevent parties and arbitrators from
evading review for manifest disregard of the law are likely to undercut the
arbitration process itself and (in international arbitrations) to discourage the
selection of the United States as an arbitral situs.89  William W. Park has
described manifest disregard as “hang[ing] like the sword of Damocles to be
grasped by award debtors who understandably seek relief from costly dam-
ages”;90 “[t]he prospect of such judicial meddling in the arbitral process can
only alarm foreign enterprises contemplating arbitration in the United States.”91
According to Hans Smit:
[T]he mere existence of this ground has proved a significant lure to losers in arbitra-
tion. . . .  Added to this has been the judicial reluctance to accept the loss of adjudica-
tory power to arbitrators. . . .  [A]lmost surreptitiously, this power has, on occasion,
been expanded . . . to manifest disregard of the terms of the agreement, which tends
to expand judicial review to virtually the entire arbitral work product. . . .  By this
process, the very foundations of the institution of arbitration are eaten away.92
The empirical evidence described above—which shows that parties frequently
challenge awards for manifest disregard but rarely succeed—is consistent with
these views,93 as is Hayford’s categorization of the manifest disregard cases.94
In short, by attempting to use manifest disregard review to police arbitrator
applications of mandatory rules, courts jeopardize the arbitration process itself.
84 Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204.
85 Id.
86 Id. (although emphasizing that “we are not holding that arbitrators should write opinions
in every case or even in most cases”).
87 E.g., Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir.) (“[T]he arbitrator
disregarded the plain and unambiguous language of the governing arbitration agreement.”),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 434 (2006).
88 Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 783 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (App. Div. 2004),
rev’d, 846 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 2006).
89 By contrast, narrowly constrained manifest disregard review—perhaps reinforced by
various other measures—should be far less destructive of the arbitration process. See infra
text accompanying notes 104-108.
90 PARK, supra note 37, at 18.
91 William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration:  The Case for FAA
Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 1253 (2003).
92 E.g., Smit, supra note 57, at 122.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
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IV. CODIFYING MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW
Given the doctrinal weaknesses of manifest disregard review and its
counterproductive application by the courts, what should be done?  My propo-
sal:  Amend the Federal Arbitration Act to make manifest disregard of the law a
statutory ground for vacating arbitration awards.  Define manifest disregard
narrowly, to require an intentional disregard of a well-established mandatory
(not default) rule.  Preclude the court from reexamining the entire record of the
arbitration proceeding; instead, permit a court to vacate an award for manifest
disregard of the law only if (1) the arbitrators state in a written award that they
are disregarding the law, or (2) the record shows that counsel for the prevailing
party urged the arbitrators to disregard the law.
Codification plainly would resolve the doctrinal uncertainties, and the nar-
row statutory definition should restrict counterproductive applications of mani-
fest disregard by the courts.  The proposal codifies the current standard for
manifest disregard but makes clear that manifest disregard does not apply to
default rules or issues of fact.  It also rejects the approach taken by the Second
Circuit in Halligan, in which the court of appeals reexamined the arbitral
record and relied on the lack of a written award in finding manifest disregard.
Thus, the proposal takes as its starting point the current narrow standard for
manifest disregard and narrows it further.
This approach will, of course, likely render manifest disregard ineffective
as a way of ensuring compliance with mandatory legal rules.  But that is not the
justification for codifying manifest disregard.  Instead, the justification is to
ensure the integrity of the judicial process.  Without manifest disregard of the
law as a ground for vacating an award, courts may be faced with the prospect of
having to enforce an arbitration award where the award on its face openly ref-
uses to follow established law.  Enforcing such an award would harm the legiti-
macy of the judicial system and also could result in a political backlash against
the arbitration process.95  Thus, the justification for codifying manifest disre-
gard is based not on the fact that the arbitrator is disregarding the law, but
rather on the open and notorious use of the judicial system to enforce an award
in which the arbitrator disregards the law.96
Sarah Cole has made a similar point in analyzing whether courts should
enforce expanded review provisions—contract provisions that provide for court
95 See Economos v. Liljedahl Bros., Inc., 901 A.2d 1198, 1203-04 (Conn. 2006).
So delimited, the principle of vacating an award because of a manifest disregard of the law is an
important safeguard of the integrity of alternate dispute resolution mechanisms.  Judicial
approval of arbitration decisions that so egregiously depart from established law that they border
on the irrational would undermine society’s confidence in the legitimacy of the arbitration
process.
Id. at 1203 (quoting Garrity v. McCaskey, 612 A.2d 742, 747-48 (Conn. 1992)); see also
Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards:  Manifest Disregard of the Law,
64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 516 (1998) (also quoting Garrity, 612 A.2d at 747-48).
96 I reserve opinion on the need for court review of awards to constrain parties from using
arbitration to avoid mandatory rules (in a less open and notorious fashion) but note that there
is little evidence so far of that happening. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Law-
less?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187 (2006).
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review of arbitration awards on grounds other than those set out in the FAA.97
While generally supporting party autonomy on the issue,98 she argues that
courts to date “have virtually ignored the threat the use of such standards
pose[s] to institutional integrity.”99  One exception she points to is Judge
Kozinski’s concurring opinion in Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera
Corp.,100 in which he agreed that the expanded review provision at issue in the
case was enforceable but stated that he “would call the case differently if the
agreement provided that the district judge would review the award by flipping a
coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”101  According to Cole, Judge
Kozinski’s “comment . . . shows a recognition that freedom of contract must
yield in those cases where the integrity of the courts as an institution is
threatened.”102  The same applies with manifest disregard review:  An award
that manifestly disregards a mandatory rule of law should be vacated because
court enforcement of such an award would threaten “the integrity of the courts
as an institution.”103
I recognize that some parties might still overuse manifest disregard
review, even defined narrowly, in an attempt to avoid liability under an arbitral
award.  Presumably a narrow, statutory definition of manifest disregard would
reduce its attractiveness as a basis for challenging an award and thus the likeli-
hood of abusive vacatur actions.  In addition, the following measures could be
considered as ways to reduce further the possibility of excessive challenges to
awards:104
• Require parties that unsuccessfully challenge an award on grounds of manifest dis-
regard to pay the other party’s attorneys’ fees or subject them to some other
sanction.105
97 Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants?  The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy
in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1206 (2000).
98 Id. at 1258-59.
99 Id. at 1259.
100 Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring), vacated, Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
101 Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 891.
102 Cole, supra note 97, at 1259 n.259 (quoting Lapine, 130 F.3d at 891).  I withhold judg-
ment on the sorts of expanded review provisions that might threaten the integrity of the
courts, but surely a clause requiring a judge to “study[ ] the entrails of a dead fowl” would
qualify.
103 Id.  To reiterate the point—in my view what threatens the integrity of the judicial system
is not court enforcement of awards that make mistakes of law, or awards in which arbitrators
disregard the law, but awards in which it is clear on the face of the award (or by extrinsic
evidence) that the arbitrators knew what the law was and nonetheless disregarded it.  If a
court would have to reexamine the evidence underlying the award, or draw inferences from
the lack of a written award, the manifest disregard is not sufficiently clear.
104 Another possibility has been suggested by Stephen J. Ware:
[C]ourts may need to require parties to announce at the outset of arbitration whether they are
asserting any claims under mandatory law. . . .  [P]arties who do not announce at the outset of
arbitration that claims under mandatory law are being asserted should be precluded from seeking
judicial review of the arbitrators’ legal rulings.  They have waived such review.
Ware, supra note 68, at 740-41.
105 Cf. B.L Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 913-14 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Courts cannot prevent parties from trying to convert arbitration losses into court victories,
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• Permit non-American parties who agree to arbitrate in the United States to opt out
of the manifest disregard vacatur standard.  The opt-out would be limited to arbi-
trations solely between non-American parties.106  Awards resulting from such
arbitrations would have much less likelihood of being enforced in the United
States,107 and the availability of an opt-out would reduce the risk that manifest
disregard review would discourage non-American parties from arbitrating in the
United States.108
Such measures should help avoid the sorts of routine challenges that unnecessa-
rily run up the costs of arbitral dispute resolution.
CONCLUSION
Manifest disregard of the law is a “non-statutory” or “judicially-created”
ground for vacating arbitration awards.  It does not appear in the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, but instead has been developed by courts—which typically derive
the doctrine from dictum in the overruled Supreme Court case of Wilko v.
Swan.  The usual test for manifest disregard—that the arbitrator knows the
applicable law but intentionally refuses to apply it—is based on a literal read-
ing of the Wilko dictum and is directly contrary to the common law authorities
cited by the Wilko Court.  Indeed, in seeking to ensure that arbitrators correctly
apply mandatory rules of law in their awards, lower courts have distorted the
doctrine further, in ways that undercut the arbitration process itself.  In short,
manifest disregard of the law, as currently applied, leaves much to be desired.
but it may be that we can and should insist that if a party on the short end of an arbitration
award attacks that award in court without any real legal basis for doing so, that party should
pay sanctions.  A realistic threat of sanctions may discourage baseless litigation over arbitra-
tion awards and help fulfill the purposes of the pro-arbitration policy contained in the
FAA.”).
106 Cf. Swiss Private International Law Act art. 192(1) (1987), in 4 INTERNATIONAL HAND-
BOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Switzerland:  Annex II-1, II-5 (Jan Paulsson ed.,
Supp. 1988) (“Where none of the parties has its domicile, its habitual residence, or a busi-
ness establishment in Switzerland, they may, by an express statement in the arbitration
agreement or by a subsequent agreement in writing, exclude all setting aside proceedings, or
they may limit such proceedings to one or several of the grounds listed in Art. 190, para.
2.”).
107 The New York Convention sets out the exclusive grounds on which courts can refuse to
enforce arbitration awards but does not preclude countries from adopting different grounds
on which awards made in the country can be vacated.  Thus, consistent with the New York
Convention, an American court could apply manifest disregard review to an international
arbitration award made in the United States. See generally Reed & Riblett, supra note 79, at
128-32 (providing overview of governing law).
108 Thus, I would preserve manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur for at least some
international arbitrations held in the U.S. and would not go so far as those commentators
who would eliminate manifest disregard review altogether for international arbitration
awards made in the United States. E.g., Richard E. Speidel, International Commercial Arbi-
tration:  Implementing the New York Convention, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra
note 76, at 185, 305 (urging Congress to adopt “Article 34 of the Model Law[, which]
permits recourse against the non-domestic award whether or not a motion for recognition
and enforcement has been filed under the same standards provided in Article V” of the New
York Convention; if Congress did so, “the domestic law of the United States for purposes of
Article V(1)(e), whether here or abroad, would be consistent with Article V and the ‘mani-
fest disregard’ exception would be relegated to the international trash can”).
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Nonetheless, in “Rethinking the Federal Arbitration Act,” manifest disre-
gard of the law should be codified as a ground for vacatur.  The justification for
codifying manifest disregard is not to ensure that arbitrators follow mandatory
rules of law in their awards.  Instead, the justification is to protect the integrity
of the judicial process—by enabling courts to avoid putting their power and
authority behind arbitral awards that openly flaunt the law.  As codified, chal-
lenges to arbitration awards for manifest disregard of the law will rarely, if
ever, succeed.  But the need to protect the integrity of the court system justifies
codifying manifest disregard, even if the doctrine only rarely is applied.
